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Caldwell et al. (CA 2 8 : ~ ~ - 4 3 )  have pointed to the perva- 
sive influence of Carr-Saunders's (1922) concept of popu- 
lation regulation throughout two-thirds of a century of 
anthropology and demography. Carr-Saunders developed 
the notion that members of "premodern" populations 
depress their fertility to maintain the "optimum num- 
ber" for group welfare because ethnographies showed 
that hunter-gatherers were not pushed by Malthusian 
forces to lead miserable lives of endless toil. The in- 
fluence of this notion of the "optimum number" was 
magnified by the work of Wynne-Edwards (1962)) who 
(citing Carr-Saunders) elaborated it to apply to animals 
in general. Wynne-Edwards argued that aspects of social 
behavior from male display and dominance hierarchies 
to territoriality were mechanisms to control population 
growth and prevent resource depletion. Cultural ecolo- 
gists in turn built theories of human social systems regu- 
lated by practices to limit population growth and deploy 
groups in time and space for the efficient use of their 
resources, often referring to Wynne-Edwards for biolog- 
ical foundation. Warfare (Rappaport 1967, Vayda 1971)) 
male supremacy and female infanticide (Harris 1977)) 
the origins of agriculture (Flannery 1973, Cohen 1977, 
Harris 1977) and its intensification (Boserup 1965, Harris 
1977)~patterns of social inequality and the origins of the 
state (Harris 1977)~ forms of religious belief and practice 
(Harris 1977)) and the industrial revolution (Harris 1977) 
were explained as means (of varying effectiveness) that 
social systems use to promote group welfare by reducing 
population pressure (Hammel and Howell, CA 28: 141- 
60). Informed by anthropological generalizations, de- 
mographers viewed recent high rates of population 
growth in the Third World as the legacy of colonial inter- 
ruptions of traditional practices which were assumed to 
have maintained "optimum numbers" in the precolonial 
past (Caldwell et al., CA 2 8 : ~ ~ - 4 3 ) .  
While anthropologists and demographers adopted the 
view that hunter-gatherers (and other traditional peo- 
ples) past and present usually practice the discipline of 
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"optimum numbers," this notion of population regula- 
tion suffered a very different fate in biology. Wynne- 
Edwards's 1962 extension of Carr-Saunders's hypothesis 
was a major stimulus to behavioral ecology because of 
its central flaw. His coherent argument and detailed ex- 
amples made it clear that individual reproductive inter- 
ests and long-term group or population homeostasis 
would not always favor the same patterns of behavior. 
Williams (1966) criticized the expectation that popula- 
tion- or species-level consequences could ever be the 
goals of natural selection. This revolutionized the study 
of animal behavior. Williams later collected the key 
thoughts of Wynne-Edwards, W. D. Hamilton, J. May-
nard Smith, David Lack, and others in a special volume 
devoted to the topic of individual- versus group-level 
benefit ( I97I). Recently Wynne-Edwards has renewed 
his hypothesis that populations evolve mechanisms to 
regulate their numbers so as not to overexploit their food 
resources (1986; see Charnov 1986 for review). Yet, mod- 
em behavioral ecology is testimony to the remarkable 
fruitfulness of the contrasting hypothesis that natural 
selection favors traits that increase individual reproduc- 
tive success, independent of population-level effects 
(Maynard Smith I982, Krebs and Davies I987, Daly and 
Wilson 1983, Trivers 1985, Charnov 1982). Even though 
the theoretical possibility of group-level benefits (partic- 
ularly with kin groups) cannot be denied (Wade 1978, 
Wilson 1983)~ general reproductive restraint to conserve 
group resources is most unlikely for any population 
(Charnov 1986). It has been by focusing attention on 
conflicts of reproductive interest between individuals 
that modem behavioral ecologists have made such prog- 
ress in understanding social behavior (Maynard Smith 
1982, Krebs and Davies 1987, Trivers 1985, Charnov 
1982). 
Behavioral ecologists have come to view responses to 
declining resources as adjustments that generally in-
crease rather than lower the lifetime reproductive suc- 
cess individuals can achieve under deteriorating condi- 
tions. Individuals by delaying reproduction or producing 
fewer offspring in a resource-poor season often increase 
the number of descendants who survive to be reproduc- 
tively successful themselves. Rather than lowering rates 
of population growth, these adjustments make rates 
higher than they would otherwise be as resources de- 
cline. This perspective, however, has had little impact 
on anthropology and demography. The notion of "op- 
timum numbers" and various other models of group- or 
society-level functions have met occasional criticism on 
grounds of theoretical inadequacy in the social sciences 
(Hardin 1968, Alexander 1979, Chagnon and Irons 1979)~ 
but the effect of these objections has been limited. It is of 
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special interest that the Caldwells, ignoring events in 
biology, mount their criticisms not from theory but 
from facts. They note how few and precarious are the 
empirical data anthropologists and demographers re- 
peatedly echo to support the notion of the "optimum 
number" and its corollary of "primitive affluence" 
(Sahlins 1972)) whereby hunter-gatherers, stepping 
lightly on their resources, meet their modest needs with 
little effort. Caldwell et al. review the ~rofound in- 
fluence of these hypotheses and call for Lore careful 
quantitative work to test them. 
Some of this auantitative work has alreadv been done. 
The ethnograpdic case most widely cited '(e.g., Harris 
1977, Cohen 1977, Sahlins 1972) to illustrate both main- 
tenance of the "optimum number" and "primitive afflu- 
ence" among hunter-gatherers is that of the !Kung of 
Botswana. The exceptional research of Richard Lee and 
Nancy Howell provides data used to show low work ef- 
fort, resource abundance, and low fertility, primarily due 
to interbirth intervals that are usually four years long 
(LeeI968, Howell I979). Nearly ten years ago, intrigued 
by the data and argument, Blurton Jones and Sibly (1978) 
wondered whether !Kung mothers were actually work- 
ing as hard as they could to have as many surviving 
children as possible, in spite of appearances to the con- 
trary. They approached the problem as biologists and 
were skeptical that individual members of a population 
would hold down their reproduction to maintain an op- 
timum group number. They considered the ecological 
constraints on !Kung mothers described by Lee (1972) 
and modeled the consequences of varying interbirth 
intervals for mothers' work loads. Their 1978 paper 
showed that, given local conditions. the interbirth inter- 
val likely to' give the most survivihg children was four 
years. Subsequently, Blurton Jones (1986, 1987) used the 
re~roductive histories of !Kung women collected bv 
~ H n c ~Howell to show that thek tua l  spacing of births 
is remarkably close to the pattern which maximizes the 
number of children that survive to be teenagers. 
Blurton Jones's work has gone largely unnoticed in the 
social sciences (for example, it is cited neither by the 
Caldwells, whose coverage of anthropological demog- 
raphy is otherwise remarkably broad, nor by Hammel 
and Howell in their discussion of ways in which human 
populations respond to population pressure. This may be 
partly because theories of group-level functions have 
been fundamental to the development of anthropology. 
If the hypotheses of "optimum number" and "primitive 
affluence" do come under the more general suspicion 
that is warranted on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds (e.g., Blurton Jones and Sibly 1978; Blurton 
Jones 1986, 1987; Bates and Lees 1979; Hawkes and 
OIConnell 1981; Smith 1984; Hill et al. 1985; Hawkes et 
al. 1985; Hawkes 1987)) the changes in anthropology and 
demography will likely be profound. 
References Cited 
ALEXANDER,. D. 1979. Darwinism andhuman affairs. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
BATES, D. G., A N D  S. H. LEES.  1979. "The myth of population 
regulation," in  Evolutionary biology and human social behav- 
ior: An anthropological perspective. Edited by N. A. Chagnon 
and W. Irons. North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press. 
B L U R T O N  J O N E S ,  N. G. 1986. Bushmen birth spacing: A test for 
optimal interbirth intervals. Ethology and Sociobiology 7:91-
105. . 1987. Bushmen birth spacing: Direct tests of some simple 
predictions. Ethology and Sociobiology 8:183-203. 
B L U R T O N  JONES,N. G., A N D  R. S I B L Y .  "Testingadaptiveness of 
culturally determined behavior: Do Bushmen women maximize 
their reproductive success by spacing births widely and foraging 
seldom?" in Human behaviour and adaptation. Edited by N. 
Blurton Jones and V. Reynolds, pp. I 35-5 8. London: Taylor and 
Francis. 
BO SERUP,E. 1965. Conditions of agricultural growth. Chicago: 
Aldine. 
CARR-SAUNDERS,A. M. 1922. The population problem: A study 
i n  human evolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
CHAGNON,   N. A., A N D  W. I R O N S .  1979. Evolutionary biology 
and human social behavior: An anthropological perspective. 
North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press. 
CHARNOV, L. 1982. The theory of sex allocation. Princeton:E.   
Princeton University Press.  . 1986. Group selection revisited. Nature 321:23-24.  
COHEN,M. N. 1977. The food crisis in  prehistory: Overpopulation 
and the origins of agriculture. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
DALY,MARTIN,  A N D  M A R G O  W I L S O N .  1983. zd edition. Sex, 
evolution, and behavior. Boston: Willard Grant Press. 
FLANNERY,K. V. 1973. The origins of agriculture. Annual Review 
of Anthropology z:271-310. 
HARDIN,G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 
162:1243-48. 
HARRIS,  M .  1977. Cannibals and kings: The origins of cultures. 
New York: Random House. 
HAWKES, 1987. "How much food do foragers need?" in  FoodK.
and evolution: Toward a theory of human food habits. Edited 
by M. Harris and E. Ross, pp. 341-5 5. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
HAWKES,  K., K. HILL,  J. F. O ' C O N N E L L ,  A N D  E. L. C H A R N O V .  
1985. How much is enough: Hunters and limited needs. Ethol-
ogy and Sociobiology 633-15. 
HAWKES,K., A N D  r.  O ' C O N N E L L .  1981. Affluent hunters? Some 
comments in light of the Alyawara case. American An- 
thropologist 83:6zz-z6. 
HILL,K., H. KAPLAN,   A N D  K.A. M. HURTADO, H A W K E S .  1985. 
Men's time allocation to subsistence work among the Ache of 
Eastern Paraguay. Human Ecology 13:zg-47. 
H O W E L L ,  N., 1979. Demography of the Dobe !Kung. New York: 
Academic Press. 
KREBS,J. R., A N D  N. B. D A V I E S .  1987.An introduction to behav- 
ioral ecology. London: Blackwell. 
LEE,R. B. 1968. "What hunters do for a living; or, How to make 
out on scarce resources," in Man the hunter. Edited by R. B. Lee 
and I. DeVore, pp. 30-48 Chicago: Aldine. -. 1972. "Population growth and the beginning of sedentary 
life among the !Kung Bushmen," in Population growth: An- 
thropological implications. Edited by B. Spooner, pp. 329-42. 
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. 
M A Y N A R D  SMITH, J .  1982. Evolution and the theory of games. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
R A P P A P O R T ,  R.  A. 1967. pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in  the ecol- 
ogy of a New Guinea people. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
SAHLINS,  M. D. 1972. Stone Age economics. Chicago: Aldine. 
SMITH,E. A. 1984. "Anthropology, evolutionary ecology, and the 
explanatory limitations of the ecosystem concept," in  The 
ecosystem concept in  anthropology. Edited by F. Moran. (AAAS 
Selected Symposium 92.) Boulder: Westview Press. 
T R I V E R S ,   R. L. 1985. Social evolution. Reading, Mass.: Benjamin 
Cummings. 
VAYDA, A. P. 1971. Phases of the process of war and peace among 
the Marings of New Guinea. Oceania 42: 1-24. 
W A D E ,  M .  J .  1978. A critical review of the models of group selec- 
tion. Quarterly Review of Biology 5 3 :101-4. 
W I L L I A M S ,  G .  C .  1966. Adaptation and natural selection: A cri- 
tique of some current evolutionary thought. Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press. 
-. Editor. 1971. Group selection. Chicago: Aldine. 
W I L S O N ,  D.  C .  1983. The group selection controversy: History 
and current status. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 
14~159-87. 
W Y N N E - E D W A R D S ,  V .  C .  1962. Animal dispersion in  relation to 
social behavior. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. . 1986. Evolution through group selection. London: Black- 
well. 
On Klein's "Analogy and 
Mysticism and the Structure 
of Culture" 
S T E P H E N  D A V I D  S I E M E N S  
Department of Anthropology, University of California, 
Los Angeles, Calif. 90024, U.S.A. 8 VII 87 
Klein (CA 24: I 5 1-80) proposes a mathematical operator 
for the calculation of complex analogies, the "apposi- 
tional transformation operator" (ATO), that could pro- 
vide a powerful tool for symbolic analysis. He illustrates 
the operator through application to the I Ching and as- 
serts that it is found throughout the cultures of human- 
kind. I will evaluate the AT0 model land his claims for 
it) from two points of view: ( I )mathkmatical precision 
and consistency and (2) applicability to cultural sym- 
bolic systems. These two aspects are particularly rele- 
vant to my research, which uses mathematical defini- 
tions of analogy to model symbolic systems evidenced in 
rituals of traditional cultures. Klein's work is important 
in this regard because he claims to offer a mathematical 
definitioi of analogy sufficiently general to apply to any 
analogical cultural symbolic system. 
Klein's mathematical system contains an ingenious 
innovation, but it is presented with an imprecision that 
has allowed for inconsistent application. Though he 
finds an ideal application in the I Ching, serious prob- 
lems arise when he attempts to apply it to cultural sym- 
bolic systems in general. Further, the AT0 system con- 
tains stronger conditions than are warranted for a 
general model of analogy. Another problem of applica- 
bility arises from Klein's unsubstantiated claim that cul- 
tural rules are encoded in surrealistic images through 
ATOs. If this claim were true, it would be an earthshak- 
ing development for symbolic anthropology. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not. 
COMPETING MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
Klein argues that his "appositional transformation 
operator" represents an advance over propositional mod- 
els in its economy in calculating complex analogies. He 
does not specify the competing models, so we can only 
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speculate what he has in mind. For instance, he does not 
refer to Lorrain (e.g., 1974) or Hesse (e.g., 1960), who 
have suggested formal definitions of analogy. He cites 
only a brief piece by Morrison and Durrenburger (1976) 
that does not contain their definition of analogy (see 
Durrenburger and Morrison 1977). This is surprising, 
since he seems to share their interest in brain processes. 
Moreover, he ignores their major point that many 
analogies that are considered formally consistent with 
most definitions of analogy should not be acceptable, 
thus raising doubts about the definitions. And, as Har- 
nad points out in his comment (pp. 170-71), Sternberg 
(e.g., 1977) and Anderson (e.g., 1981) share with Klein an 
interest in artificial intelligence as well as analogy but 
go unmentioned. 
A model formally equivalent to Klein's has been sug- 
gested by Hage and Harary (1983a:1~1-57; 1983b) in 
works that appeared nearly simultaneously with his, and 
a less general version of the model was used earlier by 
Hage (1979) in an article that Klein might have benefited 
from consulting. In contrast to Klein, Hage and Harary 
do not refer to their model as analogical; they call it 
"Boolean groups." Both models are offered as formaliza- 
tions of LCvi-Strauss's myth analyses, which deal with 
transformations among sets of pairs of contrasts. 
Whereas Hage's earlier article is restricted to the system 
formed by two pairs of contrasts, Klein's approach al- 
lows for any number of pairs of contrasts (as does Hage 
and Harary's model). All these models are known to 
algebraists as external direct products of the binary per- 
mutation group (Herstein 1975: 103-4). 
Klein's model is more easily applied than Hage and 
Harary's because of his ingenious binary notation, which 
allows the computation of permutation products by ma- 
nipulating strings of binary digits rather than consulting 
a table of composition of permutations. However, 
Klein's presentation ignores global properties of the sys- 
tems noted by Hage (1979:85) such as closure and as- 
sociativity (see appendix). With Klein, Hage and Harary 
(1983a:166-70) recognize the I Ching as an example of 
their model, but they do not develop the example in the 
same detail. 
ATOS AND ANALOGY 
"Appositional transformation operators" relate situa- 
tion descriptions in the form of feature arrays (n-tuples 
or matrices of binary digits). (An n-tuple is an ordered 
string of digits n digits long.) The n-tuples describe the 
presence or absence of features with binary digits: o and 
I. For example, the concept of "woman" might be de- 
scribed with reference to the features of "adult" and 
"male." Using "I" to indicate the presence of the feature 
"adult" and "0" to indicate the absence of the feature 
"male," we can describe the concept of "woman" with 
the 2-tuple (I,o). This description requires an agreement 
about the order of the features' occurrence in the 2-tuple. 
In this case we have chosen to put information concern- 
ing "adult" in the first place and information concerning 
"male" in the second. Klein has devised a means of com- 
